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LABOR RELATIONS-Consumer Picketing Under
Section 8(h) (4) (ii) (B) of the National
Labor Relations Act-Honolulu Typographical
Union, No. 37, 1.T.U., A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. NLRB*
When a dispute arose between a local of the International
Typographical Union and a Honolulu newspaper, the union pro.ceeded to picket several restaurants which advertised in that newspaper. The pickets carried signs and distributed handbills identifying
the dispute and asking potential consumers of the restaurants not
"to purchase ... products advertised in the struck [newspaper]." 1
However, since the restaurants did not advertise individual products
but claimed generally that they were good places to eat, the pickets'
appeal was, in effect, a request to the public to avoid patronizing
those restaurants. The picketed restaurants subsequently instituted
proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board claiming
that the picketing should be prohibited because it was a secondary
boycott which violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). 2 The union argued that its actions con• 401 F. 2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968) [hereinafter principal case].
1. Principal.case at 954.
2. 29 U.S.C. § I58(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1964). This section provides in part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4) ••• (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person • • •
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stituted consumer picketing and that therefore they were protected
under the United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits). 3
The Board found that the picketing was a violation of the NLRA
and issued a cease and desist order against further picketing by the
union. The union appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the NLRB's finding and granted its
cross-petition for enforcement of the cease and desist order. The
court stated that the pickets' request was aimed at the restaurants'
business in general and not at a specific product; 4 thus, the picketing
was not protected by the Tree Fruits doctrine and was an illegal
secondary boycott. 15
The principal case is concerned generally with the problem of
secondary activity by unions, and specifically with the application of
a judicially created exception to the general prohibition against
such activity. As originally written, section 8(b)(4) was intended to
protect neutral employers from becoming involved in disputes between other employers and unions by prohibiting certain union
activities. 6 Among the practices forbidden was the traditional secondary boycott which arises when a union in a dispute with a
primary employer brings pressure to bear on other employers (secondary employers), through their employees, to cease doing business
with the primary.7 However, the statute did not seek to insulate the
primary employer from this indirect pressure; rather, "the gravamen
of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third
party who has no concern in it." 8 In short, Congress intended to
prevent those who were only tangentially related from becoming involved .
• • • [N]othing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including
customers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute
and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have
an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the
primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver,
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the employer engaged in
such distribution ••••
3. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See text accompanying notes 13-15 infra.
4. Principal case at 954.
5. Principal case at 957.
6. As added by section 303(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120,
§ 303(a), 61 Stat., 158 (1947), section 8(b)(4) forbade a union to induce "employees of
any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment." For a discussion of the shortcomings of this approach to the problem
of protecting neutral employers against secondary pressures by unions, see Aaron,
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1086,
1112-13 (1960).
7. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 6.
8. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d
Cir. 1950) Gudge Learned Hand).
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The language of the original section 8(b)(4) prohibited unions
only from inducing "the employees" of a secondary employer.0 This
construction proved far too narrow, and in 1959, Congress sought
to expand the scope of prohibited secondary activity by enacting
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). This new provision makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union "to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce" if its objective is to force him to stop doing
business with "any other person." 10 Obviously, this prohibitory
language is very broad, but Congress did make a specific exception
for truthful publicity, communicated by means other than picketing,
designed to inform the public that a product of the primary employer is being distributed by secondary employers. 11 According to
many commentators, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), when viewed in light
of this proviso, is intended to operate as a complete ban on consumer
picketing.12 In their view, any attempt by the union to pressure a
secondary employer by inducing his customers to stop doing business with him is illegal secondary activity under the NLRA. The
effect of such secondary pressure is certainly similar to a union attempt to influence the primary by appealing to the secondary's work
force. In both cases, the neutral employer is forced into a dispute
which does not directly concern him.
Five years after the 1959 amendments, in Tree Fruits, 13 the
Supreme Court declared that the ostensibly comprehensive prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) do not forbid all consumer picketing.
In that case, the union's dispute was with a producer of apples,
but it chose to picket a retail supermarket which sold the apples as
one of many items. The picketing was not specifically aimed at the
retailer; it clearly identified the primary employer-the producer
-as the union's target and asked only that the consumers refrain
from purchasing his apples. The Court held that peaceful secondary
picketing of retail stores was not prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
when its sole purpose was to ask consumers not to buy the primary
employer's product. 14 The Court found that Congress intended to
9. See note 6 supra.
IO. NLRA, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1964). This section is repro•
duced in note 2 supra. See note Zl infra.
11. Id.
12. E.g., Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of
Tree Fruits, 49 MINN. L. R.Ev. 479, 481 n.6 (1965). See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin
Amendments to the NL.R.A., 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 274 1959; Aaron, supra note 6,
at 1114-15.
13. NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964).
14. 377 U.S. at 71. It would appear necessary to come within the standard estab•
lished that the picket signs clearly identify the primary employer (both who he is and
that he is the target) and ask only that consumers not buy his product. Such a test
very closely approximates the language of the proviso to section 8(b)(4), which
states that the union does not commit an unlawful secondary boycott if its actions
amount only to "truthfully advising the public ..• that a product or products are
~
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distinguish picketing which merely follows the struck product and
attempts to persuade consumers not to buy it from picketing which is
aimed at preventing all trade with the secondary employer. The
majority opinion stated:
When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers
not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute. . .. On the other hand, when consumer picketing is employed to persuade customers not to trade
at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck
product, not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure
designed to inflict injury on his business generally. In such a case,
the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it
creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer. 115
In the Court's view, then, only that picketing aimed at preventing
all trade with the secondary corresponds to the traditional secondary
boycott proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
Despite the Court's rationale in Tree Fruits, the decision is difficult to support as a matter of strict statutory interpretation; section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and its proviso seem to indicate that all consumer
picketing is illegal.16 In fact, the NLRB's opinion in Tree Fruits
states that " 'by the literal wording of the proviso . . . as well as
through the interpretative gloss placed thereon by its drafters, consumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment is prohibited.' " 17 Thus, the Board held that the picketing in question was
illegal. The Board's holding, then, as well as the views of some commentators,18 indicates that Tree Fruits must be regarded as a judicially created exception to the general rule against consumer
picketing. Consequently, the decision should be narrowly construed
to assure the continuing validity of the general rule.
The Tree Fruits case distinguished between picketing one of
many products handled by a secondary-a partial boycott-and an
attempt to prevent all trade with the secondary-a total boycott. This
test is difficult to apply in factual contexts that differ from the situation in Tree Fruits. For instance, when the struck product encompasses all or a substantial part of the secondary's business ("one
product" cases), 19 consumer picketing of the primary's product at the
secondary's place of business may well produce the same pressures on
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute
and are distributed by another employer [as long as there are no effects on employees
of anyone other than the primary in the course of their employment]."
15. 377 U.S. at 72.
16. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
17. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 132 N.L.R.B. II72, II77 (1961).
18. See note 6 supra.
19. That is, if he sells only one particular brand of gasoline or one type of car.
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the secondary as would the traditional secondary boycott which
section 8(b)(4) proscribes. 20
The principal case presents a somewhat related problem. The
picketed restaurants did not advertise a specific product in the
struck newspaper; rather, they claimed that they were good places
to eat. Picketing the advertised product, therefore, necessarily affected the secondary's entire business.21 The court applied the Tree
Fruits doctrine and found the total-partial boycott distinction to be
crucial. Picketing, the court stated, is permissible when only a small
part of the secondary's business is affected (as in Tree Fruits), but
impermissible when the "picketing appeal to consumers is expanded
to request a total boycott of the secondary seller . : .." 22 In the latter
situation, found to exist in the principal case, the picketing is illegal
under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
Although this conclusion is consistent with the Tree Fruits rationale, it ignores the conceptual problems involved with extending
that rationale to cases in which intangible services rather than
products are furnished by the primary. It is suggested that these conceptual problems might be solved by dividing consumer picketing
situations into two basic types which could be called "chain" and
"merger." Tree Fruits and the "one product" situations23 are examples of chain cases.24 The struck product of the primary passes to
the retailer-secondary (perhaps through middlemen) unchanged.
Consequently, it is relatively easy to visualize the product in question as that of the primary, although it is ultimately picketed at the
secondary's place of business. The problem with chain cases then
becomes one of deciding what portion of the secondary's business
must be involved in order to make the picketing a violation unde1
the Tree Fruits distinction between total and partial boycotts.
This question, although vital for an effective application of the
test, has not yet been answered by the Supreme Court.
Cases like the principal case, however, do not fit this chain con20. The court in the principal case expressly reserved opinion on the "one
product" case. Principal case at 956 n.9. The Tree Fruits decision did not specifically discuss "one product" cases either. However, the effect in such a case of
consumer picketing appears to be indistinguishable from the effect in the principal
case. Both fact situations appear closely analogous to a total boycott of the secondary,
which, under Tree Fruits, would be illegal.
21. The court in the principal case stated:
[T]he picketing appeal to consumers not to buy "products advertised in the
struck ••• [p]ress" was an attempt to cling to a legal concept evolved for another
case even though the language patently does not fit the facts of this situation.
The only realistic meaning of the appeal is the traditional "do not patronize this
establishment.
Principal case at 954.
22. Principal case at 955.
23. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
24. There may be other chain cases involving more than one product picketed, but
the analysis would be the same.
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cept, because the product of the primary (intangible services) is not
simply passed along to and sold by the secondary in the same form.
The picketing, therefore, is not directed at the particular service
in question-in the principal case the newspaper advertising-but
at the products ultimately produced and sold by the secondary.
In order to visualize the primary's product as the one being picketed,
resort must be made to a concept such as merger. In the principal
case, for instance, since advertising costs contribute to the cost of
the secondary's product and ultimately to the price a diner pays for
his meal, the advertising might be thought of as "merged" into the
secondary's product.25 The unions would undoubtedly argue that
this merger of the primary's product into the secondary's is sufficient
to identify the two so as to justify consumer picketing of the
secondary's product. It is submitted, however, that such an argument
should be rejected. Since the product of the secondary in merger
cases is substantially different from that of the primary, permitting
consumer picketing of the secondary's product does not accord with
the Tree Fruits rationale. In these situations the union's appeal
cannot be said to be "closely confined to the primary dispute." It
also seems that this type of picketing "create[s] a separate dispute
with the secondary employer."20 Moreover, in merger cases, since
picketing the primary's contribution means picketing the entire
product sold by the secondary, the appeal of the pickets is aimed
directly at the secondary's total business. Therefore, the picketing
becomes, in effect, a total boycott of the secondary which, under
Tree Fruits, clearly violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). At least one recent
Board decision is in accord with this analysis. 27
25. Examples of "merger" cases, in addition to the advertising situation, would be
cases in which the primary provided some intangible service or component part that
contributed to what the secondary ultimately sold to his customers. For an example of
an intangible service other than advertising, see Laundry, Dry Cleaning &: Dye House
Workers International Union, Local 259, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,328. See also
note 27 infra.
An example of a component parts type of merger case is Twin City Carpenters
District Council &: Boot &: Shoe Workers Union, Local 527-C, AFL-CIO, 167 N.L.R.B.
No. 51, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,858 (1968). In that case, the union picketed a
builder and seller of houses advising that the cabinets being used in the houses were
not made by union members, but failing to name the cabinetmaker at whom the
pickets were directed. The Board found this activity to be a coercive attempt to get
the builder to stop dealing with the cabinetmaker.
26. NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),
377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964). See text accompanying note 15 supra.
27. In Laundry, Dry Cleaning &: Dye House Workers Intl. Union, Local 259,
1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,328 (1967) the union picketed a restaurant that used a
linen service supplied by a laundry with which the union was engaged in a dispute.
The restaurant did not sell linen service to its customers, but merely used it in its
operations. The Board found that there was not sufficient identification between the
picketing and either a primary product or primary employer to render the picketing
permissible as an attempt to persuade consumers not to buy a struck product. See also
Twin Cities Carpenters Dist. Council & Boot & Shoe Workers, Local 527-C, AFL-CIO,
167 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,J 21,858 (1968).
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Under the approach presented above, the Tree Fruits rationale
might be stated as follows: consumer picketing which acts exclusively on the demand for a struck product of the primary and which
does not affect either any other part of the secondary's business or so
much of his business as to be a threat to its continuance is not a
secondary boycott for purposes of section 8(b)(4). If there are any
coercive effects in such chain situations, they are merely incidental
or insubstantial. On the other hand, in merger cases it is impossible
to act exclusively on the demand for the primary's product without
disturbing other business of the secondary. Therefore, in such
situations the basic evil of the traditional secondary boycott-pressuring the secondary into a complete cessation of business with the
primary-is likely to occur. It is this difference which suggests that
the Tree Fruits exception should not be extended to merger cases.
The principal case recognizes this approach.
The court in the principal case suggested another possible test
for determining the legality of consumer picketing. According to
that test, the determination would tum on whether the union's
picketing subjects the secondary employer to greater pressure or disruption than he would suffer from a successful strike against the
primary.28 In the chain cases, assuming a successful strike against the
primary, the unavailability of the primary's product because of that
strike would have substantially the same effect as a successful appeal
to consumers--the secondary would be unable to sell any of the
struck product.29 In such cases, consumer picketing of the primary's
product at the secondary's place of business should be allowed.
On the other hand, in the "merger" cases, picketing the secondary
would have a substantially greater effect on him than would a strike
against the primary. On the facts of the principal case, for example, a
successful strike against the newspaper would merely extinguish one
source of advertising services and might therefore have little impact
on the demand of the secondary's customers for his meals. However,
if the union were allowed to picket the advertised product, the
secondary would be subjected to much greater pressure affecting
his entire business. In the event of a strike, the secondary could
merely change advertising outlets, while if picketed he would bear
28. This test was suggested earlier by Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary
Boycott, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 1363, 1412 (1962). Although Professor Lesnick's focus is
limited to "common situs," "roving suits," and "reserved gate" problems, the distinction he suggests seems no less appropriate in determining when secondary picketing
should constitute a violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii){B). Carried to its logical conclusion,
however, this test would seem to permit consumer picketing in the total boycott situation when the secondary sells only the struck product (the "one product" case). This
demonstrates the weakness of the suggested test and indicates that the "merger" theory
would be preferable.
29. Of course, he might get a similar product elsewhere and, therefore, lose nothing.
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a considerable risk of losing business. Accordingly, in merger cases
consumer picketing of the secondary should be disallowed.
The result in the principal case can be supported on several
grounds, as discussed above. It is suggested that the merger-chain
analysis is preferable since it eliminates automatically any need to
consider the application of Tree Fruits once the merger label is
attached. But, helpful as this categorization is, it is not a panacea
for solving the problems of determining when consumer picketing
violates section 8(b)(4). As chain cases approach the one product
situation, a difficult line-drawing task awaits the Board and the
courts.

